Abstract: Scholars often assume that Aristotle uses the terms morphē and eidos interchangeably. Translators of Aristotle's works rarely feel the need to carry the distinction between these two Greek terms over into English. This article challenges the orthodox view that morphē and eidos are synonymous. Careful analysis of texts from the Categories, Physics, and Metaphysics in which these terms appear in close proximity reveals a fundamental tension of Aristotle's thinking concerning the being of natural beings. Morphē designates the form as inseparable from the matter in which it inheres, while eidos, because it is more easily separated from matter, is the vocabulary used to determine form as the ontological principle of the composite individual. The tension between morphē and eidos-between form as irreducibly immanent and yet somehow separate-is then shown to animate Aristotle's phenomenological approach to the being of natural beings. This approach is most clearly enacted in Aristotle's biology, a consideration of which concludes the essay.
For there is also a need to examine how it is necessary to speak about each thing, but it is necessary not to say more than how [each thing] is.
-Metaphysics Z. 4, 1030a27-28 For in all natural beings there is something wonderful.
-Parts of Animals I.5, 645a16-17
A perplexing reduplication appears in the way Aristotle speaks about form. At decisive moments in the Physics and Metaphysics, we hear what sounds like an echo, for when Aristotle designates the formal side of the composite, he often says morfhv and ei\ do~ together. 1 Our predecessors have, for the most part, heard this as a simple repetition. They either explicitly assert that the two terms are synonymous, or implicitly suggest as much by translating the two by the single word 'form.' 2 Although it is perhaps tempting to hear "hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\ do~" as a mere repetition of the same, Aristotle's insistence that the various ways we speak about beings disclose something of the truth of those beings advises against this. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to follow the intuition that guides so much of Aristotle's own thinking by attending to the ways morfhv and ei\ do~ echo off of one another, each pulling in a direction of its own.
To anticipate: if morfhv , as shape, remains irreducibly connected to the contingent individual, and ei\ do~, as the 'look' of something or its class, kind or species, pulls in the direction of the visual and the universal, then it is perhaps no hyperbole to suggest that Aristotle's thinking concerning the meaning of fi nite, sensible ouj siv a is haunted by the tension between morfhv and ei\ do~. This tension is heard most poignantly in the middle books of the Metaphysics where the attempt to defi ne ouj siv a and so to establish a general ej pisthv mh of being qua being collides with Aristotle's unwillingness to sacrifi ce the ontological autarchy of the individual for the sake of such a science. 3 In the face of this tension, Aristotle's thinking turns to a sort of phenomenology that dwells in intimate association with natural beings, deriving its defi nitions from a rigorous engagement with the things themselves. By listening attentively to how Aristotle says morfhv and ei\ do~ together in the Physics and Metaphysics, we will hear how his ontological engagement with fi nite, sensible ouj siv a leads to the biological works in which precisely such a phenomenological approach is pursued.
A Preliminary Sense of the Difference: The Categories
In order to gain a preliminary sense of the subtle but important difference between morfhv and ei\ do~, let us listen to how form is said in the Categories. In chapter eight, Aristotle considers the various senses of toiov thta, or qualities. The fourth sense he comes upon is that of the morfhv or schma of each being, that is, its shape or outward appearance. Aristotle says: "And each being, with respect to its morfhv , is said to be something of a certain sort. " 4 Here morfhv is closely associated with schma, both of which are understood to designate the physical shape of something and so to determine the sort of being it is. However, in the Categories such qualitative determinations are not ontologically substantive and so morfhv does not yet seem to take on the ontological signifi cance it will have in the Physics and Metaphysics. Here it is a mere quality.
And yet already in the Categories there is a tendency to ascribe some degree of ontological effi cacy to certain kinds of qualities. Specifi cally, a secondary ouj siv a, that is, an ei\ do~ or a gev no~, is said to signify "a certain quality. "
5 But secondary ouj siv ai are not mere qualities, like the white that signifi es a quality and nothing more; rather, as Aristotle writes, "the ei\ do~ or the gev no~ determines the quality in relation to an ouj siv a, for it signifi es that an ouj siv a is qualifi ed in some way. "
6 Here Aristotle suggests that secondary ouj siv ai determine the being of primary ouj siv ai in some ontologically more fundamental way than do mere qualities. However, we hear in these texts a certain hesitancy, for although Aristotle seems to ascribe some ontological effi cacy to the ei\ do~, atomic individuals retain ontological primacy.
This hesitancy is heard in the way Aristotle attends to how beings are saidlev gesqai. To be said-of a subject is to determine that subject in some ontologically signifi cant way: being is disclosed through lov go~. Yet what is said-of a subject, to; ei\ do~, is itself said to be "a certain quality" [poiov n ti shmaiv nei]. As so often in Aristotle, we must attend to the little indefi nite pronoun 'ti,' for it marks at once Aristotle's reluctance to grant ei\ do~ ultimate ontological authority over the individual and yet also his unwillingness to reduce the ei\ do~ to a mere quality. While such qualities are not said-of subjects, they do inhere in them. The fundamental difference, then, between ei\ do~ and morfhv in the Categories is that ei\ do~, as that which is said-of a subject but not present-in a subject, determines the being of ouj siv a in a way that morfhv , which merely inheres in the subject, does not. Ironically, however, when Aristotle begins to think the uJ pokeiv menon, or underlying subject, itself as a composite, as he does in the Physics, these two ways of saying form are brought together. The said-of dimension of to; ei\ do~ is posited as inhering-in the individual itself-ei\ do~ becomes more like morfhv . While for its part, morfhv becomes more like ei\ do~ insofar as it is given an ontological role in determining the being of the composite. Let us turn to the Physics, where this transformation of form can be heard most distinctly.
Thinking MORFHV and EI\ DO~ Together: The Physics Having established that accidental change requires three principles, two contraries and a uJ pokeiv menon, Aristotle attempts in Physics I.7 to map this model onto unqualifi ed becoming or substantial generation. 7 In turning his attention to the generation of natural beings, however, a certain ambiguity emerges in the three principle model of change, for the uJ pokeiv menon does not seem to remain constantly present through the process by which natural beings come into being. Aristotle's own example suggests as much, for even as he claims that "there is always something underlying from which that which is generated [comes to be], " he appeals to the example of plants and animals that come from a spev rmato~, or seed. The problem here is that the seed itself changes and develops during the process of generation. An implicit recognition of the inadequacy of the static conception of the uJ pokeiv menon to account for natural generation leads to a sort of crises in Aristotle's thinking concerning the being and becoming of ta; fusikav . This crises is marked by Aristotle's vacillation concerning the precise number of principles required to account for natural generation.
Such moments of vacillation allow us to hear Aristotle's thinking at work. 8 In this case, the question concerning whether the principles of being and becoming are two or three is wrapped up with and worked out through the tension between morfhv and ei\ do~. This is most evident in the diffi cult second half of Physics I.7 where, after Aristotle introduces the example of the seed and suggests that that which is generated is always a composite, he gives the following account of the meaning of the terms uJ pokeiv menon and aj ntikeiv menon: "I mean by the to be opposite [aj ntikeisqai], the unmusical, but by the to lie under [uJ pokeisqai] the human being, and the absence of schma [aj schmosuv nhn] and the absence of morfhv [aj morfiv an] and the disorder is an opposite, but the bronze or stone or gold is a uJ pokeiv menon. " Here as Aristotle begins to think the composite in terms of the distinction between form and matter, the gesture is not to the concrete appearance of an ei\ do~ in a particular parcel of matter, but to an absence of morfhv , to a sort of disorder that uncovers a deeper, more dynamic understanding of the uJ pokeiv menon. In Physics I.9, the uJ pokeiv menon is determined fi rst as matter and then, in a decisive move, as duv nami~, potency: the power that reaches out to, indeed, yearns for its form. 10 However, at the end of Physics I.7, the vocabulary of duv nami~ is not yet deployed to think the uJ pokeiv menon in relation to stev rhsi~, or the deprivation of form. Here the strange appearance of absence gives rise to a vacillation in Aristotle's thinking concerning the number of principles of being and becoming.
Aristotle's insistence that "everything that is generated is generated from a uJ pokeiv menon and a morfhv " suggests that the principles are two in number. 11 However, he goes on to consider that the uJ pokeiv menon is itself one in number but two in ei[ dei. 12 The shift from the vocabulary of morfhv to ei\ do~ allows Aristotle to isolate the formal dimension of the composite and thus to think more deeply into the dynamics of its coming into being. Once this shift is accomplished, Aristotle goes on to suggest that in one sense we need to speak about the principles as two: the uJ pokeiv menon and the ei\ do~, which itself seems to be responsible for the order and unity of the composite. But in another sense, the principles need to be spoken of as three, for the deprivation, or stev rhsi~, seems also to play a role along with the ei\ do~ in determining the being of the composite. 13 The tension at work in Aristotle's thinking at this point is well expressed in the following passage: "And it is clear that something must underlie the contraries and that the contraries are two. But in another way this is not necessary, for it would be suffi cient for one of the contraries to produce the change by its absence or presence. " 14 The shift in vocabulary from morfhv to ei\ do~ brings with it a shift in the way in which the form is understood to function ontologically. Now the very presence or absence of the ei\ do~ is said to produce the change. Generation is here thought as a kind of coming to presence.
Although the vocabulary of stev rhsi~ allows Aristotle to think generation as the coming-to-presence of an ei\ do~, the danger of this sort of formulation is that the ontological principle will be hypostasized, posited as existing outside of the concrete composite whose principle it is. To mitigate against this, Aristotle draws our attention away from a consideration of form in isolation from the composite back to the intimate connection between the uJ pokeiv menon and its form. Here the vocabulary of morfhv returns. Aristotle writes:
But the nature of the uJ pokeiv menon is known by analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, or wood is to a bed, or as that which is shapeless [a[ morfon] before it takes on the morfhv is to any of the other things that have morfhv , so this [that is, the nature of the uJ pokeiv menon] is to an ouj siv a or to a tov de ti or to being. This then is one principle, although it is not one nor a being in the manner of a tov de ti, and one principle is the lov go~ of it, and also there is what is contrary to this, the stev rhsi~.
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This passage expresses a transformation of the meaning of both the uJ pokeiv menon and the ei\ do~. Whereas in the Categories, the uJ pokeiv menon had referred simply to a determinate atomic individual like a horse or a human being, here it is understood analogically as matter before its taking shape. The absence of the vocabulary of duv nami~ can be heard in the way Aristotle emphasizes the shifted conception of the uJ pokeiv menon negatively by insisting that although the uJ pokeiv menon is one principle, it is not one in the sense of being a tov de ti-that is, it is not a demonstrably identifi able individual. For its part, the ei\ do~, which had just been imbued with new ontological authority, is again called morfhv so as to emphasize its internal operation in determining the being of the tov de ti. When, at the end of the passage, the formal dimension of the composite is again isolated, the morfhv is called lov go~ and stev rhsi~ emerges as a third kind of principle.
We hear in this confl uence of ways of saying form-morfhv , ei\ do~, lov go~, stev rhsi~-a thinking assiduously attentive to the manner in which the tov de ti comes to presence. In Physics II.1, Aristotle further refi nes the complex interaction of these various ways of saying form as he attends ever more closely to the coming to presence of ta; fusikav : "Thus, nature is said in one way as the fi rst matter underlying each of the things having in themselves the principle of movement and change, but in another way, as hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\ do~ to; kata; to; n lov gon-as the shape, that is, the look, the one in accordance with speech. " 16 The translation is admittedly awkward; but this is to allow what is expressed in the words to be heard more acutely. The kaiv here is taken as appositional so that hJ morfhv may be heard to say to; ei\ do~, but not just any ei\ do~, specifi cally that ei\ do~ which is "disclosed in speech. " 17 Here the ei\ do~ that in the Categories had been heard to pull toward the universal and the visual is at once tethered to morfhv , which holds fi rm to the contingent individual, and mediated by lov go~, the manner in which beings are disclosed in speech.
In this shift from the universal and visual to the contingent and auditory, a certain temporality emerges; it is the temporality endemic to the very comingto-presence of ta; fusikav and expressed in the following sentence: "for what is bone or fl esh in potency [duv namei] has not yet [ou[ t' e[ cei pw] its nature nor does it exist by nature until [pri; n] it takes on the ei\ do~ to; kata; to; n lov gon, by which we say what fl esh or bone is when defi ning it. " 18 We hear in this "not yet"/"until" an interval that escapes the lov go~; yet it is an interval that resonates in every attempt to delimit the very coming-into-being of beings that become. These small words, 'ou[ te . . . pw' and 'pri; n,' gesture to an absence that cannot be captured by the grasp of the lov go~. This interval, this absence, forces Aristotle's thinking to vacillate, indeed, almost to repeat itself: "Thus, in another way, the nature of things having in themselves the principle of motion would be hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\ do~, which is not separate other than in speech [kata; to; n lov gon]. " 19 Although we may speak of the nature of a being in terms of its form, it is impossible to separate out what a being is save through a certain kind of speaking. Thus, immediately after asserting that "nature is morfhv , " Aristotle must offer a sort of palinode: "but the morfhv and the fuv si~ is said in two ways, for the stev rhsi~, deprivation, is somehow [pwṽ] ei\ do~. " 20 Aristotle's tenacious engagement with the coming-to-presence of ta; fusikav has forced him to think absence itself as a sort of presence. The little word pwṽ however testifi es to the impossibility of such an act of hubris-this 'somehow,' this 'pwṽ,' points to the very limits of lov go~.
These limits resonate in the various ways Aristotle himself says form. Nowhere is this heard more acutely than in the middle books of the Metaphysics, where an extraordinary set of articulations emerge as Aristotle puts language in the service of a thinking that remains assiduously loyal to the phenomenon that is ouj siv a. In order to perceive this, however, we must listen with different ears; for the formulations that disclose the limits of lov go~ most distinctly have been systematically muted by a dense sediment of interpretation that has calcifi ed Aristotle's living, dynamic and fl exible language into a codifi ed philosophical lexicon.
Form is Said in Many Ways: The Middle Books of the Metaphysics
Let us listen to yet another way Aristotle says form. In Metaphysics Z.3, Aristotle again brings morfhv and ei\ do~ together as he distinguishes the various senses of uJ pokeiv menon:
[I]n one way it is said to be matter, in another morfhv , in a third, that which is from these. (By matter I mean, for example, bronze, by morfhv the shape of the outward appearance [to; schma th` ij dev a~], by that which is from these the statue as a composite.) Thus, if the ei\ do~ is prior to and is being more than matter, then by the same lov go~ it will be prior to that which is from both. 21 Here the tension between morfhv and ei\ do~ is again heard, for Aristotle says morfhv as he links form intimately to the shape and appearance of the composite, but as he considers the ontological priority of form, he says ei\ do~. This is an echo of the tension discernable in the Categories between the qualitative and ontological understanding of form. It is a tension that resonates through the middle books of the Metaphysics as Aristotle seeks to defi ne the concrete composite ouj siv a.
In Z. 4 Aristotle introduces the phrase to; tiv h\ n ei\ nai to designate that which each being is said to be in virtue of itself. 22 Let us allow the oddity of the formulation to hover in the air, as the familiarity of the traditional translation, 'essence,' mutes the manner in which the phrase itself both seeks to designate that which makes each being what it is and fails to capture it completely. At fi rst Aristotle seems to identify the tiv h\ n ei\ nai with that which is itself individual: "But the tiv h\ n ei\ nai is just a tov de ti, a this. " 23 However, immediately thereafter, having insisted that there is only a defi nition when the name and its lov go~ signify something primary, he suggests "[t]he tiv h\ n ei\ nai will belong to nothing that is not the ei\ do~ of a gev no~. " 24 Traditionally this sentence has been rendered something like: "[t]he essence will belong to nothing that is not the species of a genus. " 25 The use of ei\ do~ here in close conjunction with gev no~ legitimizes such translations, for indeed, as we have heard, ei\ do~ carries with it something of the universal. In the Categories it was precisely the capacity to be said of multiple subjects that won it the title of ouj siv a, albeit an ouj siv a of secondary rank. It is no surprise, then, that as Aristotle seeks to further delineate the ontological role form plays in determining the nature of the composite, the vocabulary of morfhv should give way to that of ei\ do~.
However, even here a tension can be heard, for Aristotle identifi es the tiv h\ n ei\ nai both with that which is a tov de ti and with the ei\ do~. Further, in Z.5 Aristotle seems to recognize that the sorts of beings-like the snub and indeed all natural beings-that have matter as part of their nature cannot be defi ned exclusively in terms of their ei\ do~. 26 The tiv h\ n ei\ nai of such beings must include reference to matter as well as form. Here we feel the pull of morfhv once again-form must be thought together with matter, as determining principles of the composite. In response to this, Aristotle turns his attention in Z.7 to the manner in which beings come into being-and we again hear the voice of morfhv , though here speaking through its envoy, schma: "We say what a bronze sphere is in both ways: both with respect to the matter when we say that it is bronze and with respect to the ei\ do~ [when we say] that it is this sort of shape [schma] ; for this shape is the kind into which it is fi rst placed. Thus, the bronze sphere has matter in its lov go~. " 27 In this passage, Aristotle links ei\ do~ to schma in order to insist upon the need to include matter in the account of composite individuals. He goes on to suggest that our common way of speaking hints at how matter must be mentioned in the defi nition of such composites, for "whenever a being has been generated [o{ tan gev nhtai], that from which as matter it is generated is sometimes called, not that, but that-y, for example, the statue is not stone, but stony. " 28 This peculiarity of language is heard, however, only when the being already 'has become, ' 'o{ tan gev nhtai, ' that is, while we can speak of matter before it becomes a determinate being and we can articulate the material dimension of that being once it has already come into being, we are left with only a sort of gesture to the very coming into being of the being itself. If we listen attentively, we can hear precisely such a gesture to the coming to presence of being in the vocabulary Aristotle deploys in his attempts to think the meaning of ouj siv a. It is heard in the phrase 'to; tiv h\ n ei\ nai, ' which speaks at once the imperfect tense of the Greek 'ei\ nai, ' 'to be, ' and its infi nitive. The what is it question can only be answered in terms of the what-it-wasto-be, to; tiv h\ n ei\ nai. The imperfect carries with it progressive aspect in past time, and although we are told that in this phrase the imperfect has no grammatically temporal sense, nevertheless, the phrase itself points to a certain temporality. 29 For while the infi nitive affi rms the very presence of the being under consideration, the imperfect, with its progressive aspect, signifi es that this presence is always already somehow past. The phrase speaks the temporality of the phenomenon in its very coming to presence through a lov go~ that always comes too late. The h\ n marks the fi nitude of the lov go~ through which beings come to presence.
The limit of this lov go~ is again heard in Z.8 as Aristotle says form in yet another way: "But the [ei\ do~] signifi es a such [toiov nde]; and it is not a this and a defi nite being, but what one makes or generates is a such from a this, and when it has been generated [o{ tan gennhqh/ ], it is a such this [tov de toiov nde]. " 30 Here a faint echo of the Categories, with its insistence that ei\ do~ is a sort of quality, can be heard. Morfhv too, as inseparable from the composite, resonates in this passage, for Aristotle rejects the notion that ei\ do~ is itself something defi nite and a this and thus capable of existing in separation from the composite. Yet what is most striking about the passage is the manner in which Aristotle gestures to the moment of individuation that remains inaccessible to lov go~. He does this in two ways. First, he uses a combination of demonstratives-'tov de toiov nde'-to get at something of the very coming to presence of the individual. These gestures operate on the very boundary of lov go~. As demonstratives, they are strange lov goi intent on designating the trace of that which always escapes the grasp of the lov go~-the very phenomenality of the phenomena. 31 Second, Aristotle uses the temporal clause in conjunction with a verb in the aorist tense, with its completed aspect (o{ tan gennhqh/ ), to emphasize that the moment of individuation has already occurred. Before and after remain within the sphere of the lov go~, for we may speak about a form prior to its inhering in some matter, or of a matter prior to its taking on form, and we can identify each being once it has already become, but its very coming-into-being remains muted and inaccessible. 32 We must, with Aristotle, resort to linguistic gestures. Such gestures operate on the frontier of the conceptual. In them we hear at once Aristotle's intense loyalty to the phenomenality of the phenomena and his tenacious desire to know-eij dev nai: to see, to render conceptual, to subject to an ei\ do~-the very coming into being of beings that become. 33 This tension can be heard in Metaphysics H.1, where Aristotle fi nally clarifi es the meaning of tov de ti as it relates to matter, form and the composite:
Now an ouj siv a is a uJ pokeiv menon, and in one sense, it is matter (by matter I mean that which is not a tov de ti being-at-work [ej nergeiv a/ ] but is a tov de ti in potency), in another sense it is the lov go~ and the morfhv , which is a tov de ti being separable in logo~; and [in a] third [sense] it is that which is from both, of which alone there is generation and destruction, and which is simply separable. 34 Morfhv is heard here instead of ei\ do~ as Aristotle attempts to think form and matter together as principles of the composite. Morfhv connotes this intimate connection between the form and its composite. Yet morfhv is again linked to lov go~, to the very articulation of the being under consideration. While something like the formal dimension of the composite can be isolated in lov go~, this form cannot be reifi ed into an ei\ do~ existing independently of the composite in which it is found.
However, in this passage we hear in the word 'ej nergeiv a/ ,' being-at-work, yet another, and this will be the fi nal and most decisive, way form is said by Aristotle. At the end of book H, Aristotle is concerned to address an aporia that emerges when the cause of a being is posited as existing in separation from that being itself. When this is the case, it is not clear how to account for the unity of the individual; for if a human being is what it is by participating in the idea of the Animal and the Biped, which themselves exist independently of the human being, then the human being will be two, not one-namely Animal and Biped. Aristotle suggests, however, that "if, as we say, the one is matter, the other morfhv , and the one is in potency [dunav mei], the other exists as being-at-work [ej nergeiv a/ ], that which is being sought no longer seems to be an aporia. . . . What is responsible for that which exists in potency to be at-work aside from that which produces in however many things of which there is generation? But nothing else is responsible for the potential sphere to be a sphere at-work, but this was the tiv h\ n ei\ nai in each. " 35 Here morfhv is said to designate the being-at-work of a being while matter is identifi ed with potency. Further, morfhv is now linked to tiv h\ n ei\ nai, which is understood to be an immanent principle of the being of the composite. Aristotle says morfhv here precisely because it points to form as intimately linked to the composite individual. However, the ontological effi cacy that had been associated with ei\ do~ is now ascribed to morfhv which itself gives way to the vocabulary of tiv h\ n ei\ nai and "being-at-work, " ej nergeiv a/ . 36 These later two expressions mark a shift in Aristotle's thinking away from the static and structural toward the dynamic and functional. Indeed, while morfhv and ei\ do~ are structural designations, tiv h\ n ei\ nai and ej nergeiv a/ point to the ontological importance of the manner in which the composite itself functions. 37 This way of speaking about beings recognizes that the being of a given being is ineluctably linked to what that being does. Despite Aristotle's ongoing tendency to elucidate the distinction between form, matter and the composite by appealing to heuristic examples taken from the sphere of human fabrication-a tendency that reinforces the structural over the functional-Aristotle's intense engagement with the manner in which natural beings themselves come into being has led him to think morfhv and ei\ do~ together. Indeed, both tiv h\ n ei\ nai and ej nergeiv a/ are ways of saying form that combine the competing thrusts of morfhv and ei\ do~. If morfhv cannot be separated from the being in which it inheres and if ei\ do~ is an ontological principle capable of determining the very being of that of which it is the form, then tiv h\ n ei\ nai and ej nergeiv a/ say in a fundamental way morfhv and ei\ do~ together. To say hJ morfhv kai; to; ei\ do~ is to recognize that an account of the being of ta; fusikav must assiduously attend to the ways such beings appear, it will, in short, require a lov go~ of their very biv oi, that is, a certain biology.
The Phenomenology of Life: Aristotle's Biology
Aristotle's biological works enact the very phenomenology of natural beings our analysis of the interaction between morfhv and ei\ do~ has suggested is required. These treatises do not present a taxonomy of the animal kingdom, but rather, as A. L. Peck suggests, they "collect data for ascertaining the causes of the observed phenomena. " 38 This is accomplished by describing not animals so much as the similarities and differences between them. 39 The incredible breadth of this approach can be felt at the beginning of 40 Aristotle's biology is phenomenological: it describes the differences that emerge from the direct observation of animals existing in the world. Indeed, as Heidegger has suggested, "[z]whv , " for Aristotle, "is a concept of being, 'life' means a way of being, that is, a being-in-the-world. A living being is not simply present-at-hand, but rather is in a world in such a way that it has its world. " 41 For this reason, the oJ rismoṽ, or defi nition, of such beings must rigorously attend to their manner of life, their activities, their habits as well as their parts, for only a lov go~ of an animal's being-at-work, its ej nergeiv a/ , can stand as an adequate account of the what-it-was-for-a-being-to-be, that is, of its tiv h\ n ei\ nai.
Thus, at the beginning of Parts of Animals, Aristotle takes issue with Democritus who, he says, seeks to defi ne each animal exclusively in terms of its 'schma' or 'morfhv .' The problem with this, according to Aristotle, is that "though the confi guration of a corpse has the same shape [morfhv ], it is nevertheless not a human being, " for, as he goes on to say, it will no longer be able to do its work. 42 Democritus spoke too simply. Although he was in a certain sense right to point to morfhv in his attempt to determine the being of animals, he failed to the think morfhv and ei\ do~ together in their intimate relation to matter, that is, he did not recognize that the being of each being is determined by its being-at-work, ej nergeiv a/ . An adequate account of the being of such beings cannot simply point to morfhv as shape, rather, it must describe in detail the manner of living, the actions, the habits and, indeed, the parts that manifest themselves as each animal functions in its world. As Aryeh Kosman puts it, "animals . . . exhibit most manifestly the fact that form and matter in substancebeing is linked to the concepts of activity and the structures of potentiality which empower that activity. For the being of an animal consists in its life functions, in the characteristic activities and modes of living in which it engages. " 43 Because natural beings are what they do, Aristotle's biology must become a phenomenology of life. Its intent is to fi rst gather as many observations as possible in order then to go on to consider their causes. 44 Aristotle pursues this purpose with the tenacity of an avid collector. However, as Walter Benjamin suggests, "there is in the life of a collector a dialectical tension between the poles of disorder and order. " 45 Throughout the biological works, we feel this tension in Aristotle's "special interest" in animals that seem to defy classifi cation. 46 The seal, for example, exhibits characteristics belonging to both land animals and water animals; for although, like land animals, they breathe air, do not take in water and sleep and breed on land, like aquatic animals, they spend most of their time in water and derive their food from it. 47 Aristotle calls such creatures ej pamfoteriv zonta, beings that tend toward both, or as Peck translates, "dualizers. " 48 Apes, for example, tend toward both bipeds and quadrupeds; while bats tend toward both land dwellers and fl yers. 49 And while Aristotle may ultimately classify such animals in one or the other of the categories toward which they tend, he seems to take a special joy in subverting his own classifi cations. Such "dualizers" stand as reminders of the limits of the lov go~ that seeks to set the animal kingdom into order. They are symptoms of the tension of which Benjamin spoke.
This tension animates Aristotle's phenomenological approach which at once seeks a general account while refusing to sacrifi ce the phenomenon for the sake of the theory, no matter how beautifully structured. This approach is poignantly expressed in On Generation and Corruption:
Inexperience is responsible for a weakening of the power to comprehend the agreed upon facts [ta; oJ mologouv mena sunoraǹ]. Hence those who are more at home with the beings of nature are more able to lay down the sorts of principles that admit of a wide and coherent development; while those whom a disposition to long discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts too easily show forth on the basis of a few observations. 50 Aristotle recognizes that any comprehensive view [sunoraǹ] of the whole depends upon dwelling in intimate association with the beings of nature. Yet, he is never willing to sacrifi ce the phenomena for the sake of such a vision. He is at once driven to positing principles of wide and coherent development and yet aware that any principles not fi rmly grounded in the phenomena quickly give way to dogmatism. In the face of the allure of order, Aristotle remains ultimately loyal to the things themselves.
However, this tension between order and disorder is simply another expression of the tension we have heard between ei\ do~ and morfhv at the level of form. For it results from Aristotle's unwillingness to permit the hegemony of the ei\ do~ to subvert the peculiarity of the phenomena. This loyalty to the phenomena forces Aristotle to say morfhv and ei\ do~ together in order to think form as inseparably bound to matter. The name for this, the dynamic identity of form and matter is ej nergeiv a/ , being-at-work. Yet, the very being-at-work which is the individual cannot be captured by the ei\ do~ alone; it is not merely a matter of seeing, but also a saying of matter in its being-at-work. This lov go~ of ej nergeiv a/ must tarry with the contingent individual and so become, quite literally, a lov go~ of the phenomena. Such a phenomenology will at once rigorously attend to the lov go~ through which beings come to presence and dwell in intimate association with their peculiar ways of being-in-the-world. Aristotle practices precisely such a phenomenology and so allows each being to express "something wonderful. "
NOTES

